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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines the exegetical, intellectual-historical, and theoretical 
implications of a particular feature of Philip Sidney’s late sixteenth-century sonnet 
sequence Astrophil and Stella:  its continual anxiety over authenticity – a term I use to 
signal the ability of its fictional speaker (Astrophil) to find a language capable of 
conveying his internal cognitive and affective states.  Throughout Sidney’s sequence, 
Astrophil attempts to define an authentic lyrical language by both criticizing other poets 
and asserting a formal agenda for his own texts.  His texts, however, continually 
contradict in practice what is demanded of them in theory so that the sequence shows an 
underlying pessimism summed up in Sonnet 35’s question: “What may words say, or 
what may words not say, / Where Truth itself must speake like Flatterie?” (my emphasis). 
This paradox and the pessimism it produces, I argue, can be understood by 
situating Sidney’s sequence in a rift between two conceptual frameworks for 
understanding relations between subjectivity, language, and the material world.  In one 
framework (dominant in western medieval Christendom), cognition, language, and 
material things were seen as ontologically homogenous – part of the same sublunary, 
postlapsarian material stratum.  But in another framework – emerging in the sixteenth 
century and that would become dominant in western European modernity – human 
subjects and their languages were seen as detached from the material world.   Sidney’s 
sequence, I suggest, is stuck between these two ideological polarities.  It wants to enact 
an authenticity that would become possible under the conceptual regime of modernity, Lowrance, 4 
where language is imbricated in the immaterial cognitive circuitry of sovereign, Cartesian 
subjects, and where it thus becomes capable of conveying the authenticity attributed to in 
modern ideologies of the aesthetic.  However, Sidney is caught in the conceptual space of 
an older model of language:  one that sees it as something thingly, ontologically 
homogenous with the material world.   
My first chapter introduces – somewhat lengthily – the problem of authenticity in 
Astrophil and Stella.  It develops some of the intellectual-historical horizons I want to 
situate the sequence in and introduces the main textual feature I want to follow:  Sidney’s 
tendency, in attempting to establish the authenticity of his own poetry, to criticize other 
poets for their lack of authenticity vis-à-vis a resemblance between their poetic practices 
and commercial and economic practices.  My second chapter both turns to the 
contemporary critical landscape of early modern studies and provides further elaboration 
of my positioning of Sidney in the ambiguities of early modern concepts of subjectivity, 
language, and materiality.  After this lengthy prefatory, I move on, in my third chapter, to 
read Astrophil and Stella, focusing particularly on Sidney’s use of the word “strange” – a 
term that particularly points to the rift I want to chart in the sequence.  My fourth chapter 
concludes with a methodological question:  how do the points I have made about the 
difference between modern and early modern ontologies of language, materiality, and 
subjectivity effect the contemporary critical landscape of early modern literary studies.  
Particularly, I pursue the question of whether or not a return to formalism and 
aestheticism (increasingly called for in protest to the dominance of cultural studies in 
literary interpretation) has a trans-historical exegetical validity.  In conclusion, I suggest Lowrance, 5 
that the assumptions on which such a return to the literary would stand become deeply 
problematic outside of the modern era.  
 Lowrance, 6 
Note on Abbreviations 
 
 
All citations to Astrophil and Stella refer William Ringler’s authoritative edition, 
The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1961), hereafter AS.  
All citations to Renaissance poetic manuals (including Sidney’s Defence) are to G. 
Gregory Smith’s Elizabethan Critical Essays, 2 vols. (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
1904), hereafter ECE.  Following the usual convention, the second edition of the Oxford 
English Dictionary has been abbreviated OED.  The Middle English Dictionary (Ann 
Arbor:  University of Michigan Press, 1984-) has been abbreviated MED. 
 Lowrance, 7 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1.  In Sonnet 92 of his Astrophil and Stella (written 1580-84, published 1591), 
Philip Sidney presents his sequence’s speaker, Astrophil, in a memorable, if not entirely 
earnest, rebuke of a friend who has brought news of his beloved, Stella, but has not said 
enough.   A question commences his reprimand: 
  
Be your words made (good Sir) of Indian ware, 
That you allow me them by so small rate? 
Or do you cutted Spartanes imitate?
1
 
The earliest editions of Astrophil and Stella italicize the adjective Indian.
2  While italics 
drop out of these lines altogether in later issues, their application, when applied at all, to 
the adjective signals something important about how this sentence was meant to be read 
and understood:  that the enquiry’s energia dwells in the comparison of the friend’s words 
to Indian wares rather than, simply, wares.
3  Typographically flagged, the emphasized 
adjective forms the barb of a question supported on the fundament of the unitalicized 
                                                 
1 In this particular text (AS 92) I have modified Ringler in italicizing Indian and Spartanes.  As mentioned 
above, later editions of Sidney’s sequence omit almost all italicization in these lines, and for a variety of 
reasons Ringler’s copy text of the poem is such a later edition, from a 1598 edition of the Arcadia (see 
Ringler pp. 447-57 for an explanation of his editorial rationale).   Such italics, however, are present in the 
early quarto editions of the sequence printed by Thomas Newman (1591) and Matthew Lownes (1597). 
These quartos were likely piracies, and even when an author participated in conveying his texts into print, 
italicization and emphasis was established at the press rather than in the written manuscript.  But the fact 
that they were thought in general to be worthy of emphasis – if not particularly by Sidney – signals, as I 
suggest above, something important in how they were read.   
2 For a good, brief overview of the emergence and significance of emphasis by italics in later sixteenth-
century English print culture, see R.J. Fehrenbach, “Typographical Variation in Ford’s Texts:  Accidentals 
or Substantiatives,” in “Concord in Discord”:  The Plays of John Ford, 1586-1986 (New York:  AMS 
Press, 1986) pp. 266-9.  
3 See OED, s.v. “ware,” n
3Lowrance, 8 
words and wares, subsumed under an analogous process of material making.
4  A moment 
of bombast, mocking speaker as much as recipient, is all it comes to here.  But issues of 
an ontological homogeneity between words and wares, language and commodity, poetry 
and commercial practice, are of substantial significance in the sequence as a whole.  As I 
will try to suggest, they become particularly significant for Sidney’s repeated 
problematization of the relationship between the language his speaker uses and the 
experience he strives to convey – a problematization that often occurs in a conceptual 
paradigm where language is thought about in terms not just of the materiality of 
economic goods but also of their deployment in a geographical space inscribed with 
cultural and (proto)national terms of identity. 
1.2.  Concepts of an ontological homogeneity between language and the material 
participants in economic activity have a long historical lineage in the West.
5  As Joel 
Kaye has suggested, later medieval Europe especially saw a trend of emergent 
monetization that precipitated a tendency to think about both the natural world and 
language itself from a perspective that established essence and value through 
economically influenced parameters.
6   The monetization Kaye points out collided 
                                                 
4 It should be kept in mind that Renaissance grammars would have viewed both “wares” and “Indian” as 
types of noun.  As William Lily’s Latin textbook – ubiquitous in Elizabethan pedagogy – puts it:  “Of 
Nounes, some be Substantiues, and some be Adjectiues” (William Lily, A Shorte Introduction of Grammar 
[New York:  Scholars’ Facsimiles and Reprints, 1945]).   
5 Much valuable work in illuminating this genealogy has come out of the critical movement dubbed the 
“New Economic Criticism.”  The strongly historicist studies of one of its main progenitors, Marc Shell, 
have engaged this topic in a number of historical fields.  See Marc Shell, The Economy of Literature 
(Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins, 1978) and Money, Language, Thought (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University 
of California Press, 1982).  See also Martha Woodmansee and Mark Osteen, The New Economic Criticism:  
Studies at the Intersection of Literature and Economics (London:  Routledge, 1999).   
6 Kaye writes that “the everyday use of money as an instrument or tool effects the consciousness of its 
users” (Joel Kaye, “The impact of Money on the Development of Fourteenth Century Scientific Thought,” 
Journal of Medieval History 14 [1988] p. 251).  For Kaye’s own considerations of the impact of this 
monetary mentality on literature, see Joel Kaye, “Monetary and Market Consciousness in Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Century Europe,” in Ancient and Medieval Economic Concepts of Social Justice, ed. S. Todd 
Lowry (Leiden:  Brill, 1998).  These ideas are brought together in Kaye’s Economy and Nature in the Lowrance, 9 
powerfully in this period with a resurgence of vernacular literatures across the continent.  
Such resurgence prompted many complex conceptual and poetic negotiations about, in 
the words of Anne Middleton, “the status and integrity of imaginative literature as an 
institution” in non Latin languages.
7  This crisis, according to Middleton, compelled 
authors to appear often in their own literary texts “ruminating on the traditional materials 
of composition,” meditating through fiction on the problematics of legitimacy produced 
by a departure from the frameworks of auctoritas that sustained both classical and 
clerical Latinity.
8  Frequently, such rumination took the form of metapoetic 
considerations about the relationships between the materialities of poetic and economic 
value.
9    
Take, for instance, Chaucer’s early House of Fame (c. 1379-1380), a poem 
probably written in the wake of the author’s journey to Italy and initial contact with the 
works of Dante and Boccaccio.  The text takes up the questions of vernacular authority 
and legitimacy these authors’ works had posed in a complex pastiche parodying both 
classical and vernacular writing, and targeting especially the latter’s engagements with 
the former.
10  The House of Fame opens by mocking the dream vision framing found 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange, and the Emergence of Scientific Thought (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
7 Anne Middleton, “Narration and the Invention of Experience:  Episodic Form in Piers Plowman,” in The 
Wisdom of Poetry:  Essays in Early English Literature in Honor of Morton Bloomfield, ed. Larry D. 
Benson and Siegfried Weizel (Kalamazoo, Mich:  Western Michigan University Press, 1982) p. 115.  
8 Ibid., p. 116. 
9 See also R.A. Shoaf, Chaucer, Dante, and the Currency of the Word:  Money, Images, and Reference in 
Late Medieval Poetry (Norman, OK:  Pilgrim Books, 1983). 
10 The House of Fame, in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry Benson et al. (Boston:  Houghton-Mifflin, 
1987); cited by book number and line number.  For Chaucer’s travels and the circumstances of composition 
of the House of Fame, see Derek Pearsall, The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer:  A Critical Biography (Oxford:  
Blackwell, 1992) pp. 102-18.  For a broad discussion of Chaucer’s relationship with these Italian writers – 
aimed in a somewhat different direction – see Winthrop Wetherbee, Chaucer and the Poets:  An Essay on 
Troilus and Criseyde (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1984) pp. 17-29 Lowrance, 10 
frequently in earlier vernacular texts like the thirteenth-century Roman de la Rose.
11 
Chaucer takes aim, however, not just at these texts in general but also at their contact 
with classical tradition.   The narrative later provides, for instance, a parodic play on 
vernacular versions of Vergil’s Aeneid that diminish the poem’s powerful tragic energy, 
rewriting it as a story about the amorous dalliance of Dido and Aeneas, degraded from 
denizens of alta tragedia to fodder for courtly romance.
12  Chaucer’s problematization of 
previous vernacular rescriptings of Vergil, however, is not just thematic:  it also appears 
in a formal concern with such vernacular writers’ Latin learning, as in the initial line of 
the mock Vergilian epic: “I wol now singe, yif I kan.”
13 This deliberate degradation of 
the Aeneid’s opening words (“arma virumque cano”) takes the invocations of epic voice 
and authority folded into Vergil’s Latin verb “cano” (I sing) and reduces them to 
ridiculousness by replacing the verb with the homophonic English auxiliary “kan.”
14  
Such skepticism about the formal and philological capacities of vernacular writers in the 
face of epic auctoritas signals a concern with vernacular legitimation that runs 
throughout the House of Fame and that, as Eugene Vance has argued, intersects with a 
                                                 
11 See The House of Fame 1.1-110.  For a good overview – written for another venue – of medieval dream 
visions and other gestures of allegorical framing, see Stephen Barney, “Allegorical Visions,” in A 
Companion to Piers Plowman, ed. John Alford and Anne Middleton (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  
University of California Press, 1988). 
12 This is Dante’s famous description of Vergil from the twentieth canto of the Inferno.  For a 
comprehensive overview of Virgil’s medieval reception, see Domenico Comparetti, Vergil in the Middle 
Ages, trans. E.F.M. Benecke (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1997). 
13 The House of Fame, 1.143; my emphasis. 
14 Cano’s reduction to kan is further bolstered by its subordination to the conditional “yif.”  Vergil is 
quoted from Aeneid:  Books I-VI, ed. R. Deryck Williams (London:  Bristol Classical Press, 2004) 1.1.  For 
the implications of the Classical Latin cano in terms of an epic context, see the late antique commentator 
Servius’ discussion of the lines Maurus Servius Honoratus, In Vergilii Carmina Comentarii, ed. Georgius 
Thilo and Hermannus Hagen (Leipzig:  Teubner, 1881) vol. 1.   Servius’ text circulated in both medieval 
and early modern Western Europe.  For a survey of scholarship on the implications of this particular 
moment of rewriting in Chaucer and an interesting argument about it in terms of medieval linguistic theory, 
see Martin Irvine, “Medieval Grammatical Theory and Chaucer’s House of Fame,” Speculum 60, no. 4 
(1985) p. 859.  I am in debt to Winthrop Wetherbee for pointing this moment out to me, and my brief 
discussion of this line’s significance is deeply indebted to his insights.  Lowrance, 11 
prolonged meditation on the relationship between economic and poetic practices.   
According to Vance, Chaucer sees in continental poets who exploit the classical high 
style an economy dependent “upon the poets’ ability to sustain the body of a poem as a 
serious rival for the feminine object of desire whose absence in the poem is celebrated.”
15  
For Vance, such stylistic gestures and ornamental excesses are seen by Chaucer through 
“an analogy between censure of those princes who would devalue gold currency for 
profit and those poets who give themselves over too easily to the high or noble style.”
16 
Chaucer, then, attempts in The House of Fame to resist a use of the high style that strips it 
of its hortatory or ethical powers, seeing such usages as “principally an art of inflation.”
17  
In other words, Chaucer dramatizes the “fetishistic impulses thanks to which a monetary 
system can function” by imputing them, on formal and thematic levels, to the particular 
engagement of continental romances with classical – especially Vergilian – tradition.
18  
1.3.  While such concern with the intersections and imbrications of language and 
economy emerges for Chaucer in a secular discourse devoted chiefly to issues in the 
vernacular poetics of the court and classical Latinity, other late medieval writing posits 
the problematic of the relationships between poetry, language, and economy in more 
                                                 
15 Eugene Vance, “Chaucer’s House of Fame and the Poetics of Inflation,” Boundary 2 7, no. 2 (1979), p. 
19.  The high style was part of the Classical tres genera dicendi –  most influentially formulated in the 
pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium (ed. Harry Caplan [Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press, 1954]) 4.7.10 – 4.11.16.  For a discussion of the influence of this distinction and the eventual 
beginning of its breakdown, see Erich Auerbach, Mimesis:  The Representation of Reality in Western 
Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1953), chapters 1-2 passim, 
but especially pp. 72-3.  The notion of a pure emphasis on language, on the experience of language, as a 
major experience of the emergent continental – namely Italian – vernacular literature has been explored in 
work by Giorgio Agamben:  see The End of the Poem:  Studies in Poetics, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 1999) especially chapter 2 (“Corn:  From Anatomy to Poetics”) 
and chapter 3 (“The Dream of Language”). 
16 Vance, ibid., p. 23. 
17 Ibid., p. 23. 
18 Ibid., p. 28 and pp. 30-1. Lowrance, 12 
explicitly theological terms.
19 William Langland’s late fourteenth-century Piers Plowman 
provides a particularly enlightening example of this alternate discourse:  through the 
poem’s various versions, Langland lingers over language, particularly over the possible 
relationship between linguistic and economic usage or, in Augustinian terms, usus.  In his 
De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine distinguishes usus (use) from fructus (enjoyment), 
identifying them as two ways a Christian can deal with immanent sinfulness of the 
postlapsarian world.
20  Usus is a teleologically transitive, utilitarian usage of material 
things that bears in mind their constant potential to foster sin.  Fructus, on the other hand, 
is a teleologically intransitive enjoyment that should only be directed toward higher 
horizons, things “quas aeternas atque incommutabiles” (“which [are] eternal and 
unchangeable”).
21  Fructus, however, frequently falls into a false fructu ipso facto 
focused on worldly things for their own sake.  Augustine’s early theological 
formalization of what Foucault called the Christian “art of existence dominated by self-
preoccupation” and what C.S. Lewis identified as Christianity’s transformation of 
psychological life into a moral battleground was, we should remember, developed not in 
the context of just of an ethics but also a hermeneutics – in the preamble to a text devoted 
                                                 
19 The literature on Chaucer’s particular courtly and clerkly contexts is immense.  For a good discussion, 
see Paul Strohm, “Chaucer’s Audience,” Literature and History 7 (1976) p. 31.  Strohm’s points here are 
expanded and reiterated in several other writings on this topic:  see “Chaucer’s Audience(s):  Fictional, 
Implied, Intended, Actual,” Chaucer Review 18:2 (1988) and Social Chaucer (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 1989) chp. 3.  See also R.T. Lenaghan, “Chaucer’s Circle of Gentlemen and Clerks,” 
Chaucer Review 18:2 (1988) and, in the same issue, “Chaucer’s Audience:  Discussion,” featuring the 
views of several scholars, including Richard F. Green, Paul Strohm, Lee Patterson, and Anne Middleton.  
Chaucer’s bureaucratic and clerkly audience overlapped substantially and was imbricated with the royal 
curia (see Richard F. Green, Poets and Princepleasers:  Literature and the English Court in the Late 
Middle Ages [Toronto and Buffalo:  University of Toronto Press, 1980).  It is important to keep in mind the 
complexity of the social field of the “court”; it was not merely those immediately around the King.  
20 See Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, ed. and trans. R.P.H. Green (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
1995), 1.22, 1.39. 
21 Ibid., 1.22. Lowrance, 13 
to Biblical exegesis.
22   This fact points toward a powerful overlap of concerns with 
language use and the use of worldly things more broadly that becomes pervasive in Piers 
Plowman.  In the poem, Langland sees language and money both as worldly goods that 
should be engaged with by way of appropriately aimed usus.  The ethically problematic 
or minatory personages that populate the landscape of Langland’s allegory frequently 
embody negative uses of both economic and linguistic worldly goods.  For instance, Lady 
Mede – the embodiment of teleologically intransitive worldly exchange and 
acquisitiveness – is also described as “talewis of tonge”:  garrulous, excessively inclined 
to talk, to “spende speche.”
23   This equation of economic and verbal misuse continues 
throughout Piers in other cautionary allegorical apparitions whose shortcomings are often 
signaled both “in werkes and in wordes.”
24  Likewise, the anxiety over authority and 
legitimacy that characterizes Piers’s nameless narrator is framed in a nexus of economic 
and linguistic overlap:   in his dialogue with the allegorical entity Ymaginitif, he must 
endure the figure’s accusation of the lack of an ultimate fructus, a real pedagogical 
productiveness, in his poem, a text with a putatively spiritual intent that is nevertheless 
written in the vernacular, that has broken from clerical Latinity:  “And thow medlest thee 
with makynge – and myghtest go seye thi Sauter / and bidde for hem that yyveth thee 
breed; for ther are bokes ynowe / to telle men what Dowel is, Dobet, and Dobest 
bothe.”
25  Ymaginitif doubts the need for more vernacular texts with spiritual agendas:  
                                                 
22 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 3:  The Care of the Self, trans. Robert Hurley (New York, 
1988) p. 238; C.S. Lewis, The Allegory of Love (London, 1976) pp. 60-61. 
23 The Vision of Piers Plowman, ed. A.V.C. Schmidt, 2nd ed. (London:  Everyman, 1995) 3.131.  All 
further citations of Langland are to this edition, by passus number and line number.   See MED, s.v. 
“talewise.” 
24 Piers Plowman 2.90.  Take, for instance, Mede’s father, Fals, who is described as having a “fikel tonge” 
(2.25).  See J.A. Borrow, “Wasting Time and Wasting Words in Piers Plowman B and C,” Yearbook of 
Langland Studies, vol. 17, 2003. 
25 Piers Plowman 12.16-18. Lowrance, 14 
the poem, she concludes, is a product of his own “kynde wit,” his own limited human 
cleverness and imaginative capacity, whose misuse Ymaginitif likens to the abuse of 
wealth, commercial goods (“catel”), concluding:  “So catel and kynde wit acombreth ful 
manye.”
26  
1.4.  While their pursuits of legitimacy differ distinctly, Chaucer and Langland 
find an important common ground in their positing of linguistic problems as ethical 
issues, as part of an ethics of use.
27  In other words, the issue is of the relationship 
between the use of money or goods and the use of words:  the underlying ontological 
homogeneity between the two in general is never questioned or problematized.   
The same ethical outlook toward language’s problems dominates the Petrarchan 
tradition from which Sidney’s sequence emerged.  Recent scholarship has suggested with 
particular force the dangers inherent in positing a common “Petrarchan” essence, in 
reducing the multiplicity of Petrarchan poetic production – scattered over several 
centuries and a diversity of cultural and linguistic locales – to one, common structure or 
                                                 
26 Piers Plowman, 12.55.  See MED s.v. “catel,” which equates it with “godes” and more broadly “earthly 
goods, material possessions.”  Piers Plowman is a poem perennially concerned with economic issues – 
particularly, the plight of the urban poor in the wake of enclosure and the other trends we have come to call, 
in a somewhat Marxian register, “primitive accumulation.”  For a general view, see Derek Pearsall, 
“Poverty and Poor People in Piers Plowman,” in Medieval English Studies Presented to George Kane, ed. 
Donald Edward Kennedy et al. [London:  D.S. Brewer, 1988]).  David Aers’ work has been particularly 
helpful for illuminating this from a Marxist perspective:  see especially David Aers, “Reflections on the 
‘Allegory of the Theologians,’ Ideology, and Piers Plowman,” in David Aers ed., Medieval Literature:  
Criticism, Ideology, and History [New York:  St. Martin’s, 1986]).  For more particular engagements with 
the problems of economic usage, see James Simpson, “Spirituality and Economics in Passus 1-7 of the B 
Text,” Yearbook of Langland Studies 1 (1987).  For the Mede episode – particularly the conceptual 
reworkings into Mede and Mercede, good and bad economics exchange economic practices from the B text 
to the C text – see Robert Adams, “Mede and Mercede:  The Evolution of the Economics of Grace in the 
Piers Plowman B and C Versions,” in Medieval English Studies Presented to George Kane. 
27 I am drawing here on the work of Margreta de Grazia, who distinguishes sixteenth-century (and earlier) 
attitudes toward the problems of language as ethical (see “Shakespeare’s View of Language:  An Historical 
Perspective,” Shakespeare Quarterly 29, no. 3 [1978]).  I will come back to de Grazia’s work in greater 
depth in the next chapter. Lowrance, 15 
tradition.
28  This is particularly pertinent for English Petrarchism, a tradition that shows 
incredible diversity in the sixteenth century alone.   But if we look to even a small 
sampling of this discursive field, we see a distinctly ethical perspective at play.  Take, for 
instance, Thomas Wyatt, a poet who perhaps provides sixteenth-century England’s most 
eccentric take on Petrarchan lyric, one most certainly on the peripheries of Petrarch’s 
continental afterlife.
29    What distinguishes Wyatt from his sources in Petrarch and under 
continental poets writing under his influence is a powerful concern with the relationship 
between language and truth – demonstrated in Wyatt’s perennial preoccupation with 
“trouthe,” a general principle of linguistic reliability and social trustworthiness.
30  
Wyatt’s lyrics – many adaptations of Petrarch’s poems – continually iterate trouthe’s 
absence and make the ethics governing linguistic use a central issue.  As one critic puts it, 
Wyatt transforms “the perpetual Petrarchan threat of collapsing reference” folded into 
many Petrarchan poets’ continual invocation of the so-called ineffability topos  into a 
“different semiotic threat”:  “the collapse of traditional, principled relationships on which 
a coherent society has depended and in which language has been grounded.”
31  For Wyatt, 
                                                 
28 See William J. Kennedy, Authorizing Petrarch (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1994) for a discussion 
of the diversity of the Petrarchan tradition through an analysis of commentaries on and responses to the 
Canzoniere. 
29 For helpful commentary on Wyatt’s relationship with Petrarch that emphasizes his concern with social 
convention and with the maintenance of identity in a state of social threat (particularly in terms of 
masculinity) see Lisa M. Klein, “The Petrarchism of Sir Thomas Wyatt Reconsidered,” in The Work of 
Dissimilitude:  Essays from the Sixth Citadel Conference on Medieval and Renaissance Literature, ed. 
David G. Allen and Robert A. White (London: Associated University Presses, 1992).  For a more formalist 
account of his departure from the epideictic emphasis in Petrarch, see Reed Way Dasenbrock, “Wyatt’s 
Transformation of Petrarch,” Comparative Literature 40:2 (1988) pp. 128-9. 
30 See Christopher Z. Hobson, “Country Mouse and Towny Mouse:  Truth in Wyatt,” Texas Studies in 
Literature and Language 39.3 (Fall 1997).  For the late medieval background of this term, see Richard 
Firth Green, “Ricardian ‘Trouthe’:  A Legal Perspective,” in Essays in Ricardian Literature in Honour of 
J.A. Burrow, ed. A.J. Minnis, Charlotte C. Morse, Thorlac Turville-Petre (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
1997).  
31 Thomas Greene, The Light in Troy:  Imitation and Discovery in Renaissance Poetry  (New Haven:  Yale 
University Press, 1982).  E.R. Curtius provides an influential discussion of the pervasiveness of the 
ineffability topos in his European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1953) pp. 159-62. Lowrance, 16 
such semiotic threat continually coalesces in a foregrounding of the materiality of 
language – particularly the material similarity of false words and wind:  “Windy words” 
are equated in one poem with “the eyes’ quaint game,” with amorous deceit; in another, 
the speaker talks of words that, “though they sparkle in the wind / yet shall they show 
your falsèd faith.”
32   It is in the conceptual space of an ethics of use rather than the 
conceptual space of ontology that issues of lyric language are framed, and the particular 
ethical limitations of language are continually expressed in terms of its material nature.   
1.5.  But when these examples are arranged alongside the many moments in 
Astrophil and Stella where economic and poetic practices come into comparison, crucial 
differences start to surface.   While Sidney’s sequence often problematizes poetic 
language through an ethical likening of poetic and economic practices – in the sort of 
equation of words and wares we saw earlier - it also frequently points to an ontological 
problematization of the very capacity of words to be likened to wares or money, of the 
very common hypostasis – materiality, whose assumption we saw in Wyatt – that 
provides the potential for comparison.  This is foregrounded in Astrophil and Stella’s 
many agonistic moments, where Sidney’s speaker takes aim at other poets, using them as 
a series of others against whom he establishes his own identity.  Throughout these critical 
gestures, other poets are portrayed in ways that compare their relationships to the 
language of their poems with the instrumental relationships between subjects and objects 
characteristic of commercial and mercantile exchange and transaction.   This comparison 
is based on the other poets’ resorts to repetition and cliché, their tendencies to trot out the 
tired topoi that were common currency in the erotic lyric of the later sixteenth century.  
                                                 
32 Thomas Wyatt, Complete Poems, ed. R.A. Rebholz (New Haven, Yale, 1978).  The poems cited here are, 
in Rebholz’s numbering, numbers 80 and 97.   Lowrance, 17 
For Sidney’s speaker, it is these gestures that make other poets like merchants, and that 
make the words of their lyrics like wares.   
But Astrophil is continually unable to keep from falling into these tendencies 
himself.  Often, he will criticize a putatively unoriginal or unsatisfactory poetic practice 
only to partake in it just a few sonnets later.  Take Sonnet 6:  after criticizing other poets’ 
invocations of ubiquitous Petrarchan commonplaces – the “force of heav’nly beames, 
infusing hellish paine” and “living deaths, deare wounds, faire stormes and freesing fires” 
– Astrophil proceeds to berate other poets for their use of mythological ornamentation: 
 
Some one his song in Jove, and Jove’s strange tales attires, 
  Broadred with buls and swans, powdred with golden raine: 
  
But only a few poems later (in Sonnet 8) he uses such mythological and allegorical 
ornament without comment: 
 
  Love borne in Greece, of late fled from his native place, 
    Forc’d by a tedious proofe, that Turkish hardned hart, 
    Is no fit marke to pierce with his fine pointed dart: 
  And pleasd withoour soft peace, staid here his flying race. 
 
This is hardly an isolated instance.
33  Such moments run throughout Astrophil and Stella 
and signal, I think, a powerful and perpetual contradiction that haunts the sequence.  I 
want to suggest that this is because Astrophil’s ethical critiques establish an aim – a final 
enactment in praxis of what they gesture toward in theory –that requires not an ethical 
                                                 
33 For other examples of such mythological ornaments, see especially Sonnets 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 25, 32, 
37, 43, and 52.  Astrophil and Stella periodically provides deliberate parodies of the gaps theoretical 
statement and formal praxis.  In Sonnet 15, for instance, we witness a subtly humorous instance of this in a 
criticism of alliterative poetic technique cast in an alliterative line:  “You that do Dictionaries methode 
bring / Into your rimes, running in ratling rowes” (my emphasis).  Such local irony, however, is distinct 
from the broader contradictions the sequence contains – contradictions like the one mentioned above or (to 
cite another example) the rejection of musal inspiration in Sonnet 55 that is repeatedly defied in later poems 
in the sequence (see Sonnet 70).   Lowrance, 18 
but an ontological modification of how language is perceived in the sequence and how 
language was generally perceived in the sixteenth century:  as something thingly, 
material, part of the physical world.  
1.6.  The theoretical aims of Sidney’s speaker are at odds with the epistemology 
of language his sonnets evidence.  This disjunction forms a rift running through the 
sequence – a rift that generates the sonnets’ continual alienation from their own language 
as well as their speaker’s perennial attempts – always unsuccessful – to glimpse, through 
both the negative gestures of critique and comparison and the positive moves of 
theoretical assertion, an authentic language.   The term “authentic” is difficult to detach 
from its imbrication in the idiom of Romantic aesthetics, but I use it here in the sense 
suggested by its etymological derivation (through a long developmental descent) from the 
Latin authenticus, which signals a reflexive relationship of etiological grounding, of a 
produced thing being the producer’s own.
34 Authenticity in this sense identifies the 
condition opposite the alienation we see in Astrophil and Stella.  It identifies a condition 
where an ontological homogeneity exists between a speaker and the language he uses, a 
homogeneity that allows for language to be perceived as capable of capturing his 
internal cognitive and affective states.  (  
1.7. Such an authenticity was possible in much medieval and early modern 
thinking about literature and “aesthetics,” and the possibility was grounded in a perceived 
ontological homogeneity between human subjects, their languages, and the material 
world that surrounded them.  Understanding the particular historical structure of this grid 
of ontological homogeneity requires understanding, in broad relief, the worldview that 
                                                 
34 OED, s.v. “authentic.”  See also Charlton Lewis and Charles Short, Latin Dictionary (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1966) s.v. “authenticus.”   Lowrance, 19 
dominated medieval - and to a lesser extent, early modern – Europe.  Although it is, of 
course, dangerous to assume the kind of synchronic ideological stasis we get in 
characterizations of the medieval weltanschauung by writers like D.W. Robertson, C.S. 
Lewis, or A.O. Lovejoy, recognizing the broad contours of a given culture’s view of its 
surroundings are helpful both exegetically and as a point of departure for further 
qualification and critique.
35  For our argument, then, it will be useful to venture the 
assertion that roughly between the replacement of Roman with Ecclesiastical Imperium in 
late antiquity and the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, we witness a 
worldview where human beings, their languages, and the material objects that surround 
them, are all viewed as being ontological homogenous, as existing on the same level of 
being – a level of being defined by its fundamental fallenness.
36  From such a perspective, 
the material world – its denizens, its languages, its inanimate objects – were all seen as 
part of the same mutable sublunary sphere, irrefragably and immanently suffused with sin 
in the wake of the fall, redeemable only on account of the Incarnation’s gift of messianic 
mercy.
37   
Within this medieval Christian pessimism was contained the potential for the 
ontological homogeneity the sort of authenticity we are trying to delineate requires.  We 
                                                 
35 Robertson is perhaps the most guilty of this emphasis on ideological stasis: see D.W. Robertson, A 
Preface to Chaucer:  Studies in Medieval Perspectives (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1962).  
For a Marxist critique of this feature of Robertson’s view, see Aers, “Reflections on the ‘Allegory of the 
Theologians,’ Ideology, and Piers Plowman.”  For Lewis, see The Discarded Image:  An Introduction to 
Medieval and Renaissance Literature (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1971).  For Lovejoy, The 
Great Chain of Being:  A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 
1936).  
36 For a lucid account of the emergence of Christian doctrine and its dominance in Western Europe, see 
J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (London:  Oxford University Press, 1965).  For its anticipations in 
late antique culture, see E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University 
of California Press, 1951) p. 245 and Peter Brown, The Making of Late Antiquity (Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard University Press, 1978).   
37 For a brilliant account of the ideological implications of the Incarnation, see Alexandre Leupin, Fiction 
and Incarnation:  Rhetoric, Theology, and Literature in the Middle Ages, trans. David Laatsch 
(Minneapolis, 2003)   Lowrance, 20 
see this authenticity if we turn toward the period’s models of “aesthetics” – defining the 
term in the broadest sense as the pursuit of beauty through formal praxis. From a 
worldview like the one sketched above, the obvious first task of any pursuit of beauty 
was compensating for the fact that all the forms available to the artist were seen as 
imperfect, fallen, and sinful.  Consequently, medieval aesthetic praxis was pursued 
through a conceptual framework lent to medieval aesthetics by late antique philosophy – 
particularly Platonic philosophy:  a doctrine of correspondence, the possibility for lower 
things to reflect higher things vis-à-vis their common unity in the inter-connectedness of 
the cosmos.
38  In this system, the higher immaterial values of the superlunary world were 
accessible from the sublunary by way of worldly objects’ ability to harmoniously reflect 
higher and more perfected parts of reality.
39  
The potential for methexis this aesthetic ideology provided emerged along the 
axes of harmony and proportion:  through them, the artist had to strive to bring his 
worldly materials into the greatest possible harmony with higher spheres.  Due to the 
inherent fallenness of all matter, complete fulfillment of this goal was impossible.  We 
might think of this conceptual given in terms of the constant iteration that forms a major 
structural component of medieval and early modern allegorical poetics.  This iteration is 
                                                 
38 In the first book of his commentary on Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis Macrobius provides a synoptic 
snapshot of this particular viewpoint in his description of the creation of the universe:  “He, in a bounteous 
outpouring of his greatness, created from himself Mind.  This Mind ... as long as it fixed its gaze upon the 
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more, though itself incorporeal, degenerates into a fabric of bodies” (Macrobius, Commentarii In Somnium 
Scipionis 1.14.6-7; translation from William Harris Stahl, Macrobius:  Commentary on the Dream of Scipio 
[New York, 1990]; Latin consulted in the Teubner edition, ed. J. Willis [Leipzig, 1963]). 
39 For the Neoplatonic background of this notion, see the helpful excerpts from Plotinus in Readings in 
Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics, ed. Milton C. Nahm (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:  Prentice-Hall, 1975).  This 
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Bruyne, The Esthetics of the Middle Ages, trans. Eileen B. Hennessy (New York:  Frederick Ungar, 1969) p. 
9.  For the survival of this in Renaissance thinking about meter and poetics, see S.K. Henniger, The Subtext 
of Form in the English Renaissance:  Proportion Poetical (University Park, PA:  Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1994) pp. 33-68. Lowrance, 21 
hinted at by Paul de Man’s description of the “allegorical sign” in terms of a continual 
repetition of “a previous sign with which it can never coincide,” an admission or 
unveiling of a “distance in relation to its own origin.”
 40  It is also signaled in Walter 
Benjamin’s identification of the formal and conceptual Ursprung of the Baroque German 
Trauerspiel as the need to amass copias of textual fragments in trying to transcend 
(always unsuccessfully) the mires of the post-lapsarian materiality of the worldly word; 
to attempt, through endless iteration, an always impossible return to reine Sprache.
41  
   
Even within these pessimistic frameworks, however, we still see a certain possibility for 
an identification between cognitive or aesthetic agency and the materials at hand for its 
fulfillment:  the iteration suggested by Benjamin, for instance, is a result of the common, 
fallen, postlapsarian materiality of both human subjects and their languages.  Such 
ontological homogeneity is summed up well by Giorgio Agamben:  “in these epochs,” he 
writes, “the subjectivity of the artist was identified so immediately with his material – 
which constituted, not only for him but also for his fellow men, the innermost truth of 
consciousness – that it would have appeared inconceivable to speak about art as having 
value in itself, and in front of the finished work of art it was impossible to speak of 
                                                 
40 See Paul de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in Blindness and Insight:  Essays in the Rhetoric of 
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41 For the materiality of language in the German Trauerspiel, see Walter Benjamin, The Origin of the 
German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London:  Verso, 1998) p. 200.  For reine Sprache and 
Benjamin’s post-lapsarian conceptualization of language, see Benjamin, “On Language as Such and on the 
Language of Man,” and “The Task of the Translator,” in Selected Writings Volume 1:  1913-1926, ed. 
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discussion of this, see Giorgio Agamben,  “Language and History:  Linguistic and Historical Categories in 
Benjamin’s Thought,” in Potentialities:  Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-
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aesthetic participation.”
42   Art works were not autonomous things that had to be 
cognitively appreciated:  their power derived from their presence and their 
interconnectedness to the rest of the cosmos.  When a medieval person, Agamben 
speculates, looked at a work of art:  “he had the aesthetic impression not that he was 
observing a work of art but rather that he was measuring, more concretely for him, the 
borders of his world.”
43    
Such commonality, such interconnectedness, and such ontological homogeneity, 
however, would be shattered in the epistemological ruptures that would establish 
modernity.
44  As Luc Ferry points out, the emergence of modern aesthetics in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries would occur in a shift from a worldview where truth 
and beauty were located in a divine perspective, in the higher, immaterial realms of 
inaccessible ideas, to a worldview where truth was established from the perspective of 
man, “where the sensible world was seen to have no existence except for man,” to be, “in 
the strictest sense” man’s own.
45  Modern aesthetics, for Ferry, is structured on this shift 
“in that it establishes the beautiful on human faculties, reason, sentiment, or 
imagination.”
46  As both Ferry and Agamben realize, this leads to a gap between viewing 
the work of art as objective manifestation of the artist’s perspective and as something 
whose value is established according to the perspectives of its viewers.
47  In this shift, 
according to Ferry, harmony does not “ disappear” but nevertheless undergoes a 
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44 See Heninger, The Subtext of Form in the English Renaissance, p. 62. 
45 Luc Ferry, Homo Aestheticus:  The Invention of Taste in the Democratic Age, trans. Robert de Loazia 
(Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1993) p. 20.  
46 Ibid., p. 10. 
47 Ibid.  See Agamben, The Man Without Content, pp. 98-9.  For a brilliant Marxist reading of the 
development of this ideological field, see Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford:  
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substantial shift:  it is “no longer thought of, and this is the real break with antiquity, as 
the reflection of an order external to man:  it is no longer because the object is 
intrinsically beautiful that it pleases but, rather, we can go so far as to say it is because it 
provides a certain type of pleasure that we call it beautiful.”
48 The work of art, in other 
words, shifts with the emergence of modernity from having an existence in the material 
world – a material world seen as ontological homogenous with subjects as well as objects 
– to having an existence primarily in the minds of its producers and its viewers.   
1.8.  It is in this disjunction of aesthetic production from the material world that I 
want to situate Astrophil and Stella.  Particularly, I want to look at it in terms of how the 
movement of subjectivity out of the material world involved a concordant shift in 
language, a tendency to view language as something immaterial, as a part, primarily, of 
cognition.  Through understanding the fissured conceptual context of Astrophil and Stella, 
I think we can move toward a fuller reading of the sequence’s vexed pursuit of 
authenticity, its continual concern with the inability of its own language to indicate 
accurately the cognitive and affective states of its fictional speaker.  I also think we can 
productively consider some of our own underlying assumptions about language, 
materiality, and cognition.   
My reading will focus on how the term “strange” and its derivative “strangers” 
are used in Astrophil and Stella.  The term is capable, in the later sixteenth century, of 
signaling both a cognitive dissonance, solely subjective, and an actual location in 
geographical-cultural space.  Reading its split semantics in Sidney’s sequence, I want to 
consider how Astrophil and Stella both moves toward a theoretical goal that requires 
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detaching language from the material space of the world and still dwells within a 
conceptual framework that locates language in the world.   
 Lowrance, 25 
Chapter 2:  Authenticity and Language, Materiality and Subjectivity 
 
 
 
2.1.  Before moving on to the further intellectual-historical or exegetical 
components of my argument, however, it seems helpful to turn for a moment to the 
critical landscape that has dominated the interpretation of Sidney’s sequence – a critical 
landscape particularly averse to the invocation of a category like authenticity.  Invoking 
the term in anything other than a negative sense is a definitively dubious maneuver in a 
contemporary critical landscape largely devoted to historicisms and versions of cultural 
studies that take texts less as the formal accomplishments of authors’ aesthetic agency 
and more as symptomatic documents of particular ideological or discursive localities.
49  
For early modern literary studies, this agenda has asserted itself largely in the form of 
New Historicism – a movement whose demise is declared constantly but whose spirit, 
like that of Shakespeare’s Caesar, seems to walk abroad among us, “mighty yet.”  As far 
back as Rosemond Tuve, we can see recognition of the difficulty of detaching 
authenticity from the aesthetic argot of Romantic and post-Romantic theories of poetry.
50  
But contemporary resistances to the Romantic idea of lyric as the aestheticization of 
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selfhood have taken less from Tuve’s attempts to fashion a formalism focused on the 
rhetorical and logical theories dominating the period’s pedagogy and poetics and more 
from the post-structuralist critiques of the liberal enlightenment subject found in thinkers 
like Foucault and Althusser.  
2.2.  We might think about this particular disciplinary movement by turning 
briefly back to what is, in many ways, its inaugural moment:  Stephen Greenblatt’s 
Renaissance Self-Fashioning (1980).  Greenblatt’s study takes as its point of departure an 
“increased self-consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, 
artful process” in the sixteenth century.
51  For Greenblatt, this will toward self-fashioning, 
toward the deliberate production of identity, is counterbalanced by identity’s imbrication 
in the period’s increasingly intricate and hegemonic structures of power, or what 
Greenblatt, following Clifford Geertz, calls “control mechanisms.”
52  These mechanisms 
mediated the sixteenth-century’s fashionings of selfhood in “the passage from abstract 
potential to concrete historical embodiment.”
53  Accordingly, “literature functions within 
this system in three interlocking ways:  as a manifestation of the concrete behavior of its 
particular author, as itself the expression of the codes by which behavior is shaped, and as 
a reflection upon these codes.”
54  Thus, for Greenblatt, it is necessary to forge an 
understanding of literary texts as parts “of the system of signs that constitutes a given 
culture.”  Such an interpretation’s “proper goal, however difficult to realize, is a poetics 
of culture.”
55   
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Chicago Press, 1980) p. 2. 
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Such a stance toward literature leads to interesting implications in the reading of 
lyric, implications indicated in Greenblatt’s gestures toward the genre in one of the most 
powerful and influential readings Renaissance Self-Fashioning provides:  its engagement 
with the poetry of Thomas Wyatt.
56  In Wyatt, Greenblatt sees a seeming struggle to 
articulate individual identity – autonomous, free from the constraints of court.  This 
struggle, he acknowledges (along with many other readers of Wyatt), is pursued 
negatively:  through continual critiques of courtly life’s inadequacies, its lack of stability, 
reliability, “trouthe.”
57  But Greenblatt departs from these readings in arguing that, while 
on the surface such negative articulation is the point of many Wyatt poems, in reality 
“there is no privileged sphere of individuality in Wyatt, set off from linguistic convention, 
from social pressure, from the shaping force of religious and political power.”
58  Wyatt 
“may complain about the abuses of the court”; “he may declare his independence from a 
corrupting sexual or political entanglement.”
59  But he always does so from within a 
context, a culture, a perspective hegemonically and ineluctably imprinted with “the 
essential values of domination and submission, the values of a system of power that has 
an absolute monarch as head of both church and state.”
60  In his poetry Wyatt struggles 
hopelessly against a cultural system he cannot escape.  “For all his impulse to negate,” 
Greenblatt writes, “Wyatt cannot fashion himself in opposition to power and the 
conventions power deploys; on the contrary, those conventions are precisely what 
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constitute Wyatt’s self-fashioning”
61 For Wyatt, then, the pursuit of individuality and 
stability through lyric articulation are eroded as his speaker continually runs up against 
the constraints of Henrician court life.  
2.3.  Wyatt has only a walk-on part in Greenblatt’s rewriting of England’s early 
modern literary history as the story of selves both struggling against, and being 
constituted by, the cultural codes and power structures suffusing their social situations.  
But Greenblatt’s early gesture toward lyric exerted substantial sway on later New 
Historicist engagements with the genre and its marks certainly show in scholarship on 
Astrophil and Stella over the last few decades.  Take, for instance, the work of Ann 
Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass.  They argue that Sidney’s sequence shows how 
Renaissance love poetry could “function as a complex displacement of the ideological 
pressures of the court.”
62  Authenticity, “real” romantic feeling – these, for Jones and 
Stallybrass, are irrelevant; the erotic parameters of Sidney’s text are “never pure.”
63  
Rather than reflecting upon erotic experience or the private space of sexual affect, 
Sidney’s sonnets forcefully fail to separate the “supposedly ‘private’ sphere of love” from 
“its similarities and dissimilarities to the public world of the court.”
64  The sequence, then, 
is powered by play between “the contradictory tyrannies of court life (the need to succeed 
at any cost versus the ideal pose of the disinterested advisor)” – tyrannies channeled into 
unrequited eros, finding “their counterparts in the contradictory tyrannies of love,” in an 
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Literature 24, vol. 1 (1984) p. 54.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. Lowrance, 29 
eroticized political imaginary that scholars like Louis Adrian Montrose have suggested 
powerful feature of the Elizabethan court.
65  
Jones and Stallybrass provide an excellent example of the stance scholars have 
taken toward late sixteenth-century sonnets in the last few decades.  But New Historicist-
influenced concerns with how early modern literature lacked lucid distinctions between 
the binaries that often structure our ideations of individuality – private versus public, 
political versus apolitical, sovereign identity versus cultural determination – have come 
under attack, in recent years, for their underlying assumptions about Renaissance notions 
of selfhood.   Katharine Eisaman Maus, for example, has pointed to such scholarship’s 
potential confusion of philosophical claims about the instability and ultimate untenability 
of subjectivity in general and historicist claims about the particular ways selfhood and 
inwardness were grasped in the Renaissance.  Many historicist critics, she admits, have 
been powerfully and productively influenced by post-structuralist critiques of the 
sovereign, liberal, enlightenment subject.  But the confusion of philosophical and 
historicist claims that seems to follow in the wake of such influence often leads to 
negations of the very existence of the “psychological category of the inward or the 
private” in Renaissance England.”
66 Responding to this tendency, Maus aims to 
rehabilitate early modern notions of inwardness, individuality, and subjectivity.  Her 
concerns are largely legal and dramatic:  she provides interesting discussion of Othello as 
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well as sixteenth-century testimonial procedures.  But her critique, I think, has important 
implications for the literary field more broadly.  Citing scholarly instances of the 
confusion of claims noted above, one of her prime instances is indeed Jones and 
Stallybrass’ reading of Sidney. Their reading rejects “as illusory the possibility of a 
subjectivity prior to or exempt from social determination.”
67  Such an argument, she 
admits, might very well have philosophical or ontological validity.  But in being worked 
out through reading a Renaissance text, it blends philosophical and historical claims to 
the point of risking an effacement of the intricate paths on which sixteenth-century poetry 
pursued its own notions of selfhood, inwardness, individuality outside of political or 
cultural determinations.   “Philosophical claims about the necessary social constitution of 
any subjectivity, Renaissance or modern,” she concludes, are confused in readings like 
that of Jones and Stallybrass “with historicist claims about a specifically early modern 
form of subjectivity.”
68   
Anne Ferry’s work has attempted to articulate such specifically early modern 
subjectivity with admirable historical and philological finesse.   According to Ferry, the 
rhetorics of inwardness and selfhood dominating sixteenth-century discourse were still 
deeply indebted to medieval notions of selfhood where “the experience of the particular 
subject is always treated as exemplary … of general truths.”
69  But, Ferry argues, from 
within the conceptual and linguistic parameters of such discourses, new notions of 
individuality and subjectivity were emerging in the sixteenth century – particularly in 
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lyric poetry.  In this period, English lyric pushed, as it developed, against the prevailing 
linguistic frameworks for cataloguing and describing experience. It struggled to move out 
of these older models of inwardness and individual cognition and to articulate new 
notions of a more autonomous, more unique selfhood starkly anticipating modern notions 
that would emerge, more clearly, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  (She cites 
especially the philosophical work of Descartes and Locke, which she sees anticipated 
particularly in Shakespeare’s Sonnets).
70
2.4.  Astrophil and Stella forms a focal point of Ferry’s argument.  She sees the 
sequence as centered on a “struggle with the distinction between what is in the heart” and 
a “language of poetry” that seems, to the speaker, incapable of expressing it.
71  The 
sequence, she claims, is “the earliest poem in English to make its central concern the 
relation between what may be felt ‘in truth’ and what may show ‘in verse,’ an issue 
explored and complicated throughout Astrophil and Stella in ways which create new uses 
of language for portraying inward experience in a new kind of poetry.”
72  These new uses 
of language, however, never quite surmount the obstacles they face and Sidney’s speaker 
runs repeatedly up against the problem of authenticity, “the difficulty…of showing in 
verse his experience in truth has found no solution, as the sonnets which follow 
demonstrate.”
73   
Perhaps Ferry’s narrative – teleological to the point of whiggishness – seems 
somewhat simple and reductive.  But – unlike much recent criticism – her reading of 
Astrophil and Stella importantly foregrounds the sequence’s preoccupation with its own, 
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never quite resolved formal and aesthetic anxiety.   Recent historicist criticism (as 
indicated above) has tended to think about Sidney’s sonnets in cultural contexts ranging 
from the court to the colonies, but has largely ignored their own, stated formal 
concerns.
74   Older formalist readings have, conversely, tended to raise up Astrophil and 
Stella as an ideal emblem of the cratylic merger of sound and sense, a brilliant 
achievement and avatar of the cratylistic aesthetics of the New Critical formal ideal – in 
spite of the sequence’s own very explicit protestations, its own alienation from the 
language that constitutes it.
75   Though her terms may be outdated, Ferry realizes this 
central rift, and her analysis affords a good point of departure for thinking more seriously 
about just what Astrophil and Stella’s anxiety about its own language points to.
76   
As stated before, my argument seeks to suggest this central unresolved difficulty 
over the issue of authenticity in Astrophil and Stella can be situated in terms of a tension 
between two shifting ontologies of the relationships between cognition, language, and 
materiality.  While Ferry tends to see Sidney as significant mainly for his proleptic 
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anticipation of modern modes of cognition and self-reference, I am rather inclined to see 
the sequence as engaged in a violent and vertiginous struggle with its own linguistic 
conceptions, with the materiality of language in its own conceptions.    
2.5.  Recent scholarly engagements with English Renaissance literature have 
tended to foreground such struggle, focusing on the complex and difficult dynamics 
through which early modern subjects delineated and defined themselves in relation not 
just to structures of power but also in relation to materiality, objects, things.
77  The 
emergence of these categories as idées fixes has become a major feature of the 
contemporary intellectual scene across the social sciences and humanities, embracing and 
energizing pursuits from philosophical and theoretical critique to bibliographical and 
textual studies.
78 Much of this new methodological movement’s energy has derived from 
a dissatisfaction with an excessive emphasis on questions of subjectivity:  as Bill Brown 
puts it in the introduction to a recent anthology exploring this turn, an emphasis on things 
and matter “might offer us dry ground above those swirling accounts of the subject, some 
place of origin unmediated by the sign, some stable alternative to the instabilities and 
uncertainties, the ambiguities and anxieties, forever fetishized by theory.”
79    
Few fields have embraced this emphasis with as much enthusiasm as early 
modern literary studies, fast becoming a field where, as one scholar puts it:  “at the 
moment …a declared interest in material culture – objects, things, bodies, places – has 
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become synonymous with a claim to theoretical currency, methodological innovation, or 
even, at its most dramatic, to the promise of disciplinary reinvention.”
80  
What an emphasis on objects has provided for Renaissance studies specifically 
has been a movement away from the emphasis on subjectivity engendered – as we saw 
before – by New Historicism and its long and diverse afterlife.  Such potential is put 
forward eloquently in what might be called this movement toward materiality’s most 
powerful and polemical précis:  the introduction to Subject and Object in Renaissance 
Culture (1996) by Margreta de Grazia, Peter Stallybrass, and Maureen Quilligan.  In this 
essay, the editors explicitly oppose an emphasis on material objects and material culture 
to a (traditionally New Historicist) concern with subjects and their formation.
81   New 
Historicism, they charge, has placed its priority persistently on subjects, on their social 
and political imbrications and emergences, at the cost of dematerializing and stranding 
subjectivity in the windless linguistic and semiotic abstractions of Foucauldian discourse 
or Marxian ideology.  For de Grazia, Stallybrass, and Quilligan, making such a focus on 
subjectivity, such an examination of the subject’s enmeshment in the period’s sites of 
linguistic and ideological power, a primary critical cynosure reaffirms – on a rudimentary 
level – the narrative of the Renaissance as apparition of the modern that has haunted 
historians and scholars since the vastly influential work of Jakob Burckhardt.   For 
Burckhardt, the Renaissance encompasses the emergence of individuality, of a 
subjectivity that learns through science to increasingly throw off the bonds of the natural 
world, and learns through philosophy to resist the mind-forged manacles of medieval 
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religion.
82  For Burckhardt and his successors (they cite particularly Ernst Cassirer) the 
Renaissance is a point where “the subject’s relation to the object was that of mastery or 
would-be mastery:  the mind trained and positioned to understand and overcome the 
object of its interest.”
83  Their point in the anthology, and the point of much recent 
scholarship that shares its underlying critical assumptions, is to explore the ways in which 
objects constituted selfhood in the Renaissance in explicit, acknowledged ways.
84
The effects of this new agenda in early modern literary studies have been diverse.  
Many scholars have turned their attention toward material objects and their cultural and 
literary lives.  Others, however, have directed their attention toward language itself, 
which – as we mentioned before – was viewed in the sixteenth century as something 
resolutely material, thingly, in the world.   Margreta de Grazia’s work on the history of 
perceptions of language in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries provides particularly 
rigorous guidance for charting some of the implications of this profound different in 
linguistic perceptions between the early modern period and our own.   In the shift from 
sixteenth to seventeenth-centuries, she writes, words lose their thingness, cease to be seen 
as material objects and start to be required “to represent things or matter” – forgoing, in 
the process, “their own thingness.”
 85  In this movement, according to de Grazia, we start 
to see a shift away from an ethical attitude toward language – seeing it as a tool whose 
shortcomings are the result of the shortcomings of its human users – and a movement 
toward an ontological concern with language, a belief that its shortcomings are part of its 
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own nature.
86  This belief intersects in the seventeenth century with another emerging 
view:  that language structures the relationship between human cognition and the external, 
material world.
87   It is, indeed, this emerging belief that results in the century’s diverse 
anxieties about its ability to convey truth, from Bacon’s warning “that words, as a 
Tartar’s bow, do shoot upon the understanding of the widest, and mightily entangle and 
pervert the judgment” to Locke’s later claim, at the close of the century, that language 
confuses cognition whenever “men suppose words to stand also for the reality of 
things.”
88    
2.6.  Language’s disjunction from materiality - as previously suggested in 
somewhat different terms - accompanied a broader realignment in the epistemological 
and ontological parameters of European thinking.  The most convenient intellectual-
historical marker of this shift comes in the Cartesian cogito, where the subject is defined 
as a res cogitans, a thinking thing at odds with the material corporeality of its body as 
well as of its surroundings – both grouped into the category of res extensa, radically 
opposed to perception, cognition, and identity.  Individuals, however, do not single-
handedly shatter epistemes, and as Ernst Cassirer reminds us, Descartes’ was not a cogito 
ex nihilo.
89   Descartes’ radical skepticism solidified a view that had been gradually 
emerging in the decades preceding its articulation:  a view of the material world whose 
deep-structures were gradually redefining the realm of things as radically external to 
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consciousness, radically disjoined from consciousness.
90  And this would eventually lead 
to an internalization of language to cognition and a consequent dematerialization of 
language along with cognition.
91  Heidegger saw this as a major moment in the history of 
what he called the “forgetting of being”:  with Descartes, “the sole, genuine access” to 
the world became a narrowly defined knowing, “intellectio, in the sense of the kind of 
knowledge we get in mathematics and physics.”
92   
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht has recently elaborated Heidegger’s critique of Cartesian 
metaphysics’ modifications of the subject/object binary into a broader and more 
capacious conception of the epistemological rifts that cut across the early modern period 
in its mediation of medieval and modern forms of culture.   Gumbrecht casts the 
Renaissance as a moment of transition from what he calls a “presence culture” to what he 
calls a “meaning culture.” 
93 According to Gumbrecht, the most major difference between 
presence cultures (like that of medieval Europe) and meaning cultures (like that of 
modern Europe) comes in how they respectively conceive the relationship of 
consciousness with the body and the material world.  Bodies are, in a presence culture, 
the dominant point of human self-reference.  In a meaning culture, however, self-
reference becomes centered on a disembodied consciousness, “eccentric to the world” – 
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which Gumbrecht (following Heidegger) identifies with the Cartesian cogito.
94  This 
distinction regarding consciousness leads Gumbrecht into another important difference 
between the two cultural types in how consciousness understands and engages with its 
surroundings.  In a meaning culture, knowledge can “only be legitimate if it has been 
produced by a subject in an act of world-interpretation … that is, by penetrating the 
‘purely material’ surface of the world in order to find the spiritual truth behind it.”
95  But 
for a presence culture, knowledge is not produced exclusively, or even most importantly, 
by human interpretive agency; it is more often revealed:  “For a presence culture,” 
Gumbrecht writes, “legitimate knowledge is typically revealed knowledge.  It is 
knowledge revealed by the god(s) or by different varieties of what one might describe as 
‘events of self-unconcealment.’”
96   
This shift in the legitimation of knowledge, as Gumbrecht realizes, necessitated 
detaching of meaning from the materiality, the presence of the material world – a shift 
whose impact upon conceptions of language he characterizes in terms of the dichotomy 
between Aristotelian and Saussurean conceptions of the linguistic sign, the Aristotelian 
sign being the main marker of presence culture’s understandings of language and the 
Saussurean sign being the main marker of meaning cultures’ understandings of language.  
In Saussure’s analysis, according to Gumbrecht, the sign is a “coupling of a purely 
material signifier with a purely spiritual signifier (or ‘meaning.’),” while for Aristotle the 
sign is a “coupling between substance (something that requires space) and a form 
(something that makes it possible for substance to be perceived).”
97  Meaning cultures, 
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then, tend to think of language as unmoored from the materiality of its voicing and its 
writing (or, as de Man might have it, “inscription”).
98  They tend to think of language as 
something that’s significance is located in cognition.  By contrast, presence cultures 
emphasize and incorporate the materiality of language into their linguistic understanding.  
Particularly, they tend to conceptualize language in terms of its status as spoken voice, as 
the phonological materiality of sound.
99    
2.6.  Gumbrecht’s schema provides a good way to think about the context in 
which I want to locate Astrophil and Stella.  Sidney’s sequence both signals forward 
toward the parameters of a meaning culture while remaining moored in the conceptual 
space of a presence culture.  Consequently, it both affirms and struggles with the older 
ontological homogeneity and authenticity possible in texts more ideologically stable.  The 
existence of such stability in the field of early modern lyric has recently been analyzed by 
Roland Greene.   Greene sees a stable relationship between a materially perceived 
language and subjectivity as a key part of the Renaissance’s notions of lyric and its 
“compact with subjectivity.”
100 Greene claims this compact was built on the basis of an 
Aristotelian view of matter inherited through Horace and other peripatetic poetic 
theorists.
101   Such a view placed poetry in the conceptual grid of Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism, locating its inception in the imposition of form on the substance.  This 
survives powerfully into the Renaissance, as Greene notes.  Julius Caesar Scaliger, for 
instance, speaks of language as a “rude and formless body” (rudi atque inchoato 
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corpori):
102  As Greene realizes, this view of matter frequently provided the basis an 
“early modern conviction that form and meaning can be – must be – adjusted to one 
another, that they are adaptable by genre and within genres”
103 – conviction evidenced in 
a passage from George Puttenham’s Arte of English Poesy (1589) Greene alludes to, 
where Puttenham is specifically discussing the sonnet form: 
 
The first founder of all good affections is honest loue, as the mother of all 
the vicious is hatred. It was not therefore without reason that so 
commendable, yea honourable a thing as loue well meant, were it in 
Princely estate or priuate, might in all ciuil common wealths be vttered in 
good forme and order as other laudable things are. And because loue is of 
all other humane affections the most puissant and passionate, and most 
generall to all sortes and ages of men and women, so as whether it be of 
the yong or old or wise or holy, or high estate or low, none euer could 
truly bragge of any exemption in that case: it requireth a forme of Poesie 
variable, inconstant, affected, curious and most witty of any others, 
whereof the ioyes were to be vttered in one sorte, the sorrowes in an other, 
and by the many formes of Poesie, the many moodes and panges of louers, 
throughly to be discouered: the poore soules sometimes praying, 
beseeching, sometime honouring, auancing, praising: an other while 
railing, reuiling, and cursing: then sorrowing, weeping, lamenting: in the 
ende laughing, reioysing & solacing the beloued againe, with a thousand 
delicate deuises, odes, songs, elegies, ballads, sonets and other ditties, 
moouing one way and another to great compassion.
104  
 
Here, the method of amorous lyric is characterized by a proliferation of formal venues 
whose diversity is demanded by the affective abundance of love, “the first founder of all 
good affections.”  The implied belief, however, is that the formal materiality of language 
can always capture experience.  A similar idea is suggested in Samuel Daniel’s Defence 
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of Rhyme (1603), where – defending the “multiplicitie of Rymes” used in sonnets – 
Daniel claims that they have been    
 
…so farre from hindering their inuentions, as it hath begot conceit beyond 
expectation, and comparable to the best inuentions of the world:  for sure 
in an eminent spirit, whome Nature hath fitted for that mysterie, ryme is 
no impediment to his conceit, but rather giues him wings to mount, and 
carries him not out of his course, but as it were beyond his power to a farre 
happier flight.  Al excellencies being sold vs at the hard price of labour, it 
followes, where we bestow most thereof, we buy the best successe: and 
Ryme being farre more laborious then loose measures (whatsoeuer is 
obiected) must needs, meeting with wit and industry, breed greater and 
worthier effects in our language. So that if our labours haue wrought out a 
manumission from bondage, and that wee goe at libertie, notwithstanding 
these ties, wee are no longer the slaues of Ryme, but we make it a most 
excellent instrument to serue vs. Nor is this certaine limit obserued in 
Sonnets, any tyrannical bounding of the conceit, but rather a reducing it in 
girum, and a iust forme, neither too long for the shortest proiect, not too 
short fort the longest, being but onely imployed for a present passion. For 
the body of our imagination, being as an vnformed Chaos without fashion, 
without day, if by the diuine power of the spirit it be wrought into an Orbe 
of order and forme, is it not more pleasing to Nature, that desires a 
certaintie, and comports not with that which is infinite, to haue these 
clozes, rather than, not to know where to end, or how farre to goe, 
especially seeing our passions are often without measure?
105
 
For Daniel, the “the body of our imagination” to an “vnformed Chaos without fashion, 
without day.”  Such chaos can, by the “diuine power of the spirit,” of the poetic act, be 
“wrought into an Orbe of order and form.”   In their application of Aristotelian 
hylomorphism to a description of poetic production, both these texts evidence an 
assumption, as much as an assertion, of ontological continuity between language, 
cognition, and materiality:  words and thoughts, words and emotions, are the same hyle 
on which the form of lyric is imprinted.  As Greene convincingly argues, and as 
Puttenham and Daniel suggest, this view held a substantial sway in early modern lyric.  
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But, as I have tried to suggest, the later sixteenth century also witnessed the nascence of 
new conceptual frameworks that would challenge the basic assumptions of such a view – 
that is, the ontological homogeneity of matter, consciousness, and language.  It is such a 
challenge that powers Astrophil and Stella’s vexed relationship with authenticity and the 
model of language in which it is historically forced to dwell.  And it is to the textual 
manifestations and ramifications of this vexed relationship that we will now turn. Lowrance, 43 
Chapter 3:  Sidney’s Strangers 
 
 
 
3.1.  The adjective “strange” and its substantivized form “strangers” provide 
particularly interesting indices by which to trace both the ontological anxiety discussed 
above and some of the implications for how it leads Sidney to imagine instrumental 
linguistic and mercantile practices.  Particularly, they allows us to pursue both the ways 
in which Sidney’s sequence struggles with the materiality of language in its pursuit of 
authenticity and the ways in which part of the materiality of language it runs up against in 
attempting to define itself is one in which language is thought about as deployed in the 
material, geographical, and political space of the world. 
3.2.  That “strange” should serve as a marker of identity, a way for Sidney to 
situate his relationship to others, is hardly surprising.  The word first came into Middle 
English from Old French, originally signaling people and things culturally or 
geographically foreign.
106  We see this meaning still very much in use during the 
sixteenth century (Marlowe’s Barabas, for instance, complains that a Maltese tax levied 
on the Jews tries to tax “strangers”).
107  We also find it prevalent in frequent objections to 
the use of foreign words, described as “strange” – for instance, in a prefatory letter to 
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Hoby’s translation of Castiglione’s Courtier (1561), or later on in Samuel Daniel’s 
Defence of Rhyme (1603).
 108  
But increasingly in the sixteenth century, “strange” starts to be used in another 
sensed, signaling unfamiliarity not in reference to geography or culture but rather in 
terms of the feelings, perceptions, reactions of an individual.  It starts to refer, in other 
words, to what is unusual and unexpected in terms of a person rather than just a place or 
a people.
109  Variants of the expression “it is a strange thing” and variants become, for 
example, common currency in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century prose of 
Francis Bacon’s Essays.  One of the essays, “Of Great Place,” provides an example of the 
use of this locution, as well as evidence of some of the broader ways the adjective’s 
newer sense was deployed.   Bacon uses the word to describe the relationship between 
subjectivity and material objects that results in an instrumental, materialistic possession.  
“Men in great places” of wealth (as well as power), he begins, are “thrice servants:  
servants of the sovereign or state, servants of fame, and servants of business.”
110 Such 
servitude springs from the need to keep what one has, whether in terms of worldly wealth 
or worldly power.  Men in great places must continually rely on the shifting vicissitudes 
of worldly fortune to keep what they have.  For Bacon, this produces an erosion of 
selfhood through a denigration of self-focused care. “It is a strange desire,” he writes, “to 
seek power and to lose liberty; or to seek power over others and to lose power over a 
man’s self.”
111  Such desire is “strange” because it makes men possessed by it eventually 
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“strangers” to themselves:  “Certainly men in great fortunes are strangers to themselves”; 
they have no time “to tend their health, either of body or mind.”
112    
Bacon bolsters this last argument with a Senecan sententia:   “Death lies heavily 
on the man who, too well known to others, dies a stranger to himself.”
113 While certainly 
not counseling withdrawal from the world of public life, Bacon does seem to be 
advocating a self-sufficiency not dissimilar from Stoic ideas of the behavior necessary for 
happiness (eudaimonia).
 114  In this particular moment of Classical engagement, however, 
we see an important navigation of a Stoic tradition of thought about the implications of 
the relationship between the self and worldly goods and power.  For Stoic thinking, 
worldly possessions (or bona, goods) threaten a stable subjectivity in that a concern with 
them erodes an internal governance of the passions and resistance to the constant flux of 
worldly mutability. The conflict between bona (goods) and the state of being bonus (good) 
occasions Cicero, in his Paradoxa Stoicorum, to puzzle how the two can be derived from 
the same verbal source (bona is a plural form of the neuter substantivization of the 
adjective bonus).
115  In Christian thinking, however, this Latin ambiguity is incorporated 
into an ideological paradigm where the subject is seen as part of a fallen material world 
whose value is rendered problematic in general.  Augustine asserts that bona are 
dangerous to the subject not because they threaten an integrated and autonomous 
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selfhood – selfhood being always insufficient in itself, needing the power of divine grace 
(gratia) – but rather because they tempt the sort of relationship he describes with the term 
fructus, a teleologically transitive relationship with the fallen things of the material world, 
that are ultimately insubstantial because they occupy the lower, material, sublunary rung 
of the universe.
116    
  For Bacon, however, a new mindset on how the dangers of an excessive 
investment in material things threaten subjectivity emerges – one closer to pre-Christian 
Stoicism, emphasizing the autonomy and singularity of the subject.  In this 
simultaneously novel and traditional turn, strangeness comes, for Bacon, to identify the 
dangerous existential issues that an excessive investment in material things provides.  For 
Bacon, “strange” marks the problematic position of a subject enmeshed in the materiality 
of the world, and thus alienated from his own autonomous selfhood.  Such a perspective 
on the self parts substantially from the medieval view, first articulated in Augustine, 
where the fallen world’s minatory materiality tempts teleological confusion, exchanging 
enjoyment for use, forgetting the ultimate aim of human activity is somewhere and 
something higher and better than the world at hand.  Matter threatens instead by calling 
into question the care of a self now seen as immaterial, beyond things alone. 
3.2.  The shift in priority apparent in Bacon is also evidenced in Astrophil and 
Stella, in a sonnet that does not directly pertain to issues of lyric and language, but 
nonetheless provides a good segue to the conceptual framework by which Sidney engages 
them.  One of the more well known in the sequence, this text springs from a series of 
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paronomasiac plays on the name of Lord Robert Rich, husband of the supposed source 
for Stella, Penelope Devereux.
117   
 
Rich fooles there be whose base and filthy heart 
Lies hatching still the goods wherein they flow, 
And damning their own selues to Tantals smart, 
Wealth breeding want; more rich, more wretched growe: 
Yet to those fooles Heau’n doth such wit impart 
As what their hands do hold, their heads do know, 
And knowing loue, and louing lay apart 
As sacred things, far from all dangers show. 
But that rich foole, who by blind Fortunes lot 
The richest gemme of loue and life enioys, 
And can with foule abuse such beauties blot; 
Let him, depriu’d of sweet but vnfelt ioys, 
Exild for ay from those high treasures which 
He ￿irtu not, grow in only folly rich! 
118
 
Collapsing Lord Rich into the more capacious category of “Rich fooles,” the speaker 
excoriates their “base” “filthy” hearts that lie “hatching still the goods wherein they flow, 
/ And damning their owne selves to Tantals smart / Wealth breeding want, more blist, 
more wretched grow.”  For Sidney’s speaker, a “rich fool” treats all possessions, 
including the “richest gemme of Love” signaling Stella, like his “goods.”  He cannot, in 
other words, distinguish the instrumentality of material possession from other kinds of 
possession and relation, and cannot distinguish a person from a thing, and cannot 
ultimately distinguish growing more “blist” from growing more “wretched.”
119  This 
attitude leads to the “foule abuse” the poem hints at and Astrophil concludes:  “Let him, 
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deprived of sweet but unfelt joyes / (Exil’d for ay from those high treasures which / He 
virtu not) grow in only folly rich.” 
In this particular poem, the implied materiality of sexual possession, and the 
abuse it apparently occasions, is contrasted with Astrophil’s own relationship to Stella, 
one that gives her a greater meaning, beyond the mere materiality of sexual possession.  
This emphasis on immateriality is mirrored in how Sidney conceptualizes the relationship 
of his speaker with the language of his poetry.  The word “goods,” for example, deployed 
in the sonnet above in its more immediate sense of material possessions, is deployed in 
Sonnet 15 to describe literary materials and the sort of instrumental relationship with 
them Sidney sees in other poetry and tries to distance from his own.   
 
You that do search for everie purling spring 
Which from the ribs of old Parnassus flowes, 
And everie floure, not sweet perhaps, which growes 
Neare thereabouts, into your Poesie wring; 
You that do Dictionaries methode bring 
Into your rimes, running in ratling rowes; 
You that poore Petrarch’s long deceased woes 
With new-borne sighes and denisend wit do sing; 
You take wrong waies; those far-fet helps be such 
As do bewray a want of inward tuch, 
And sure, at length stol’n goods doe come to light: 
But if (both for your lovee and skill) your name 
You seek to nurse at fullest breasts of Fame, 
Stella behold, and then begin to indite. 
 
Opening with a somewhat confusing combination of a typical term Renaissance 
rhetoricians used to refer to verbal ornament, “floure,” with the physical place of 
Parnassus, Sidney generates a fictional scene where the flowers of rhetoric are rendered 
literal, and other poets are portrayed as pillaging Parnassian springs and grounds, Lowrance, 49 
“wringing” the fancies and figures of the Classical auctores into their own verse.
120  This 
visually striking image, however, fades after the fourth line as he ridicules users of the 
“Dictionaries method” (alliterative composition, which his approbation formally reflects) 
and poets who “poore Petrarchs long deceased woes / With new-borne sighes and 
denisend wit do sing.”  Such signing and sighing is described, a few lines later, as a theft 
of literary “goods” (“at length stol’n goods doe come to light”).  Not only do these other 
poets rely on literary theft to produce their texts; they treat the work of other poets like 
Petrarch instrumentally, like property or “goods.”    
This sort of behavior Sidney repeatedly describes as “strange.”  Coming back to 
our focus on this adjective, we see it employed, in various forms, in Sonnet 1: 
 
Loving in truth, and faine in verse my love to show, 
That the deare She might take some pleasure of my paine: 
Pleasure might cause her reade, reading might make her know, 
Knowledge might pitie winne, and pitie grace obtaine, 
  I sought fit words to paint the blackest face of woe, 
Studying inventions fine, her wits to entertaine: 
Oft turning others’ leaves, to see if thence would flow 
Some fresh and fruitfull showers upon my sunne-burn’d braine. 
  But words came halting forth, wanting Invention’s stay, 
Invention, Nature’s child, fled step-dame Studie’s blowes, 
And others’ feete still seem’d but strangers in my way. 
Thus great with child to speake, and helplesse in mu throwes, 
  Biting my trewand pen, beating my selfe for spite, 
  ‘Foole,’ said my Muse to me, ‘looke in thy heart and write.’ 
         
In verses dulce et utile, Astrophil resolves to reveal his feelings to Stella, to delight, 
instruct, and eventually persuade.  Pursuing this, he studies “others leaues” but finds 
insufficient their “inventions fine.”  Eventually, “others feet still seemed but strangers in 
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my way” and “Invention, Natures childe, fledde step-dame Studie’s blowes.”  William 
Ringler reminds us to read this passage in the context of the Renaissance rhetorical notion 
of invention (inventio) suggesting Sidney makes invention a central principle of his 
poetics and so opposes himself to other theoretical frameworks where poetry’s origin is 
located in imitation (imitatio), in accumulating and aping others’ work to produce one’s 
own.
121  Pursuing this point, Ringler signals the famous passage in the Defence of Poesy 
where Sidney censors sonneteers who apply “fiery speeches” so “coldely” that “if I were 
a Mistres [they] would never perswade mee they were in loue.”
122 Personifying 
Eloquence, he says that she is appareled,  
 
or rather disguised, in a Curtizan-like painted affectation:  one time with 
so farre fette words, they may seeme Monsters, but must seeme straungers 
to any poore English man; another tyme, with coursing of a Letter, as if 
they were bound to followe the method of a Dictionary; an other tyme, 
with figures and flowers extreamelie winter-sarued.  But I would this fault 
were only peculiar to Versifiers, and had not as large possession among 
Prose-printers, and (which is to be meruailed) among many Schollers, and 
(which is to be pittied) among some Prechers.  Truly I could wish, if at 
least I might be so bold to wish in a thing beyond the reach of my capacity, 
the diligent imtators of Tullie  and  Demosthenes  (most worthy to be 
imitated) did not so much keep Nizolian Paper-bookes of their figures and 
phrases, as by attentiue translation (as it were) deuoure them whole, and 
make them wholly theirs.  For nowe they cast Sugar and Spice vpon euery 
dish that is serued t othe table; like those Indians, not content to weare 
eare-rings at the fit and naturall place of the eares, but they will thrust 
Ieweles through their nose and lippes, because they will be sure to be 
fine.
123
 
What I would emphasize about this passage is not just its concern with theoretical 
polarities, but the fact that the register in which issues of imitation and invention are 
discussed quickly shifts, a few lines later, from concerns of persuasive efficacy and 
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rhetorical coherency, to a characterization of this coldly applied fiery language as 
consisting of “far-fetched” words and tropes, which Sidney claims “must seeme strangers 
to any poore Englishman.”
124
Both these critical moments elevate inventio over imitatio, but also think about 
the issues they invoke in terms of the strangeness of factitious feet and words, in terms of 
a nexus of valences encompassing the geographical, national, and economic.  Sonnet 1 is 
the first time “strange” and its lexical relatives occur in Sidney’s sequence, but it sums up 
many of the deployments discussed above.   Sidney repeatedly uses the adjective to 
define his poetic product in relation to other poets, and in doing so frequently invokes 
both of its senses to characterize other lyric productions as not only unfamiliar, 
psychologically foreign, but also geographically, socially, and economically alien in their 
similarity to mercantile instrumentality.  Consider Sonnet 3: 
 
Let daintie wits crie on the Sisters nine, 
That bravely maskt, their fancies may be told: 
Or Pindare’s Apes, flaunt they in phrases fine, 
Enam’ling with pied flowers their thoughts of gold: 
  Or else let them in statelier glorie shine, 
Ennobling new found Tropes with problemes old: 
Or with strange similes enrich each line, 
Of herbes or beastes, which Inde or Afrike hold. 
  For me in sooth, no Muse but one I know: 
  Phrases and Problemes from my reach do grow, 
And Strange things cost too deare for my poore sprites.   
  How then? Even thus:  in Stella’s face I reed, 
  What Love and Beautie be, then all my deed 
But Copying is, what in her Nature writes. 
 
Here, other poets, described as “daintie wits,” not only cry out to the Muses and ape 
ancient authors like Pindar, but also “enrich” their lines with “strange similes” of “herbes 
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or beastes which Inde or Affrick hold.”  Catachrestically compelling an economic term – 
enrich – into the service of literary description (his usage predates the first such use of the 
term to describe literary language that the OED provides),
125 Sidney subtly suggests a 
homology between the strange similes these other poets produce in representing the 
contents of India of Africa, and the goods, wares, or commodities merchant traders 
acquire in their contact with these places.
126  That lyric production and mercantile activity 
might be compared is not a novel concept in sixteenth century lyric.  Take, for instance, 
Sonnet 15 in Spenser’s Amoretti:     
 
Ye tradefull Merchants that with weary toyle 
  do seeke most pretious things to make your gaine: 
  and both the Indias of their treasures spoile, 
  what needeth you to seeke so farre in vaine? 
For loe my love doth in her selfe containe, 
  all this worlds riches that may farre be found: 
  if Saphyres, loe her eies be Saphyres plaine, 
  if Rubies, loe hir lips be Rubies sound: 
If Pearles, hir teeth be pearles both pure and round; 
  if Yvorie, her forhead yvory weene; 
  if Gold, her locks are finest gold on ground; 
  if silver, her faire hands are silver sheene, 
But that which fairest is, but few behold, 
  her mind adornd with vertues manifold.
127
 
But while Spenser considers the similarity in terms of a playful homology and collapse of 
modes of emotitive, erotic and mercantile investments, Sidney takes the similarity far 
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more seriously in how he views his own lyric production.  Acknowledging in his diction 
and its valences the imbrication of mercantile activity with cultural and geographical 
alterity, he appropriates categories of national and cultural solidarity and identity to frame 
his own production as more authentic.  As opposed to these seekers and accumulators of 
strange similes, Astrophil knows only one muse and “phrases and problems from my 
reach do grow / And strange things cost too deare for my poore sprites.”  Other poets’ 
words and tropes are imagined in terms of both economic unavailability and geographical 
and cultural distance, detachment; these other poets seem comparable in their literary 
practices to merchants who go out and pillage the world, bringing back foreign goods.  
Astrophil, however, is a homebound lover to whom these things foreign things seem 
strange, whose verse only flows from Stella herself. 
  3.3.  Examining the language of strangeness in Astrophil and Stella, we can see 
throughout the sequence a complex tendency to criticize other poets for literary behaviors 
Sidney’s speaker himself engages in, but to simultaneously situate this critique in the 
realm of geographically and culturally inscribed space.  This signals the core 
contradiction of the sequence:  its being torn between wanting to articulate a particular 
mode of authenticity that requires a disjunction of language from the material world and 
still positioning language in a material continuum, a spatial continuum.   
Sidney’s strangers are poets from whom he can never, in the end, formally 
distinguish himself.  In lieu of such distinction, as a way of responding to the 
impossibility of achieving the authenticity that is sought after, Astrophil and Stella 
criticizes other poets in terms that blend together anxiety about mercantile instrumentality 
and non-English (as well as non-Occidental) otherness.   Lowrance, 54 
Chapter 4:  Lyric, Lexis, and History 
 
 
 
 
4.1.  In this concluding chapter, I hope to provide a coda to some of the exegetical, 
historical, and theoretical assertions made in previous pages.  Particularly, I want to 
suggest some possible implications of these arguments for the contemporary critical 
scene of literary studies in the United States.   Recent years have witnessed complaints - 
from a number of quarters - about the dominance of professional literary interpretation by 
cultural studies and politicizied varieties of cultural theory and critique.
128   Such 
complaints came initially (in the 1980s and early 1990s) from the Neoconservative Right, 
taking the form of a kind of paranoia about villainously politicized and postmodernized 
“tenured radicals” polluting the pristine minds of impressionable undergraduates.  
However, more recently, professional literary scholars and theorists have themselves 
turned toward the issue of literary studies’ definition, trying to delineate just what its 
disciplinary boundaries must necessarily include and exclude  in order to preserve their 
intellectual, institutional, and – ultimately – financial viabilities.  The work of Stanley 
Fish especially has argued the need for a disciplinary redefinition around the study of 
texts qua texts.  In Professional Correctness (1995), Fish takes a stand against academic 
ambitions toward social critique and change.  According to Fish, we must ask – in the 
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face of such priorities – just what the “kind of thing” is that we, as literary critics, do.
129  
The answer, Fish argues, is simple:  we study and teach – along formal and aesthetic lines 
– canonical literary texts.   
Few critical writings over the last decade better embody this argument in both 
theory and practice than Helen Vendler’s The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets (1997).  In 
this fascinating combination of manifesto and commentary, Vendler uses Shakespeare’s 
Renaissance lyric sequence to assert the disciplinary priority of formalism and 
aestheticism in our understandings of literature.  Further, she argues that lyric poetry 
especially is a textual realm where “social” readings are, quite simply, not valid.   
In what follows, Vendler’s commentary will be my primary point of reference.  
Taking her claims about the trans-historical validity of aesthetic and formal exegesis as 
indicative of broader contemporary disciplinary movements, I want to examine how the 
differences in basic ontologies of language, materiality, and subjectivity we have seen in 
the early modern period might problematize the historical scope of a return to the literary, 
the aesthetic, and, most importantly, the formal.  Particularly, I will be concerned with 
the issue of close reading, and how some of its basic, underlying assumptions become 
difficult to maintain when it is applied to texts outside of the modern, Western notion of 
the literary and of literature.  
4.2.  Before pursuing this question, however, I would like to make another 
observation about the particular ways in which language was conceived in the sixteenth 
century.  We have already seen how an early modern lyric writer like Sidney conceives of 
language in material terms.  But we should also realize that early modern ontologies of 
                                                 
129 Stanley Fish, Professional Correctness:  Literary Studies and Political Change (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p. 16. Lowrance, 56 
language thought about it in a way that emphasized word and trope over syntax.
130  This 
observation is well demonstrated by two passages from Sidney we have already discussed 
in another context, earlier, and for different reasons:  first, Sidney’s critique, in the 
Defence, of other writers use of words that are “far-fette” and seem like “monsters” or 
“straungers” to “any poor Englishman”
131 and the similar sonnet that begins Astrophil 
and Stella and which, for convenience, I reprint below: 
 
Loving in truth, and faine in verse my love to show, 
That the deare She might take some pleasure of my paine: 
Pleasure might cause her reade, reading might make her know, 
Knowledge might pitie winne, and pitie grace obtaine, 
  I sought fit words to paint the blackest face of woe, 
Studying inventions fine, her wits to entertaine: 
Oft turning others’ leaves, to see if thence would flow 
Some fresh and fruitfull showers upon my sunne-burn’d braine. 
  But words came halting forth, wanting Invention’s stay, 
Invention, Nature’s child, fled step-dame Studie’s blowes, 
And others’ feete still seem’d but strangers in my way. 
Thus great with child to speake, and helplesse in mu throwes, 
  Biting my trewand pen, beating my selfe for spite, 
  ‘Foole,’ said my Muse to me, ‘looke in thy heart and write.’ 
 
The previous chapter’s argument situated this and other sonnets in terms of the 
materiality of language in sixteenth-century conceptions and Sidney’s struggle to move 
beyond it while remaining confined within it.  What I would like to point out now, 
however, is that both these passages evidence a critical concern squarely centered on 
word and trope rather than syntax.  The “dainty wits” that form the antecedent subject of 
the first eight lines of the sonnet are criticized for how they unfold their fancies in 
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“phrases,” tropes,” and “similes.”  Their words are “far-fetched,” their similes, “strange,” 
but Sidney’s agonistic eye never turns to the architecture of their sentences.
132   
Historically, this makes sense:  one of the strongest continuities in the traditions 
of both theoretical linguistics and grammatical pedagogy from classical antiquity to the 
Renaissance was a resolute “preoccupation with the word” and devaluation of syntax.
133  
But what is the significance of this emphasis on word and trope over syntax in terms of 
how we might formalistically read the poetry of this period?   
Modern models of lyric poetry tend to focus on the poem as a whole, and their 
view of diction, lexis, individual words, subsequently subordinates them to the syntactic 
structure of the text in toto.  Take, for instance, Winifred Nowottny, who argues that the 
best analysis of the diction of poetry “concentrates on the relation between the object and 
the point of view and promotes sensitivity to the way in which words are used to induce 
or define attitudes other than those in which everyday language allows us inertly to 
rest.”
134 Any language, she claims, is diverse; it divides into many idiolects, is imbricated 
in many different occupations and pursuits.  But poetry “has the extreme peculiarity of 
being able to raid other forms of language at will, taking from them as much or as little as 
it chooses and doing what it likes with the bits.”
135  At will is the operative phrase here.  
Nowottny emphasizes the power of the poet to master objects, situations, and different 
lexicons by imposing a central perspective.   
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For Nowottny, lexis cannot stand alone; like Aristotelian hyle, it must be stamped 
by the “formal elements” and “poetic structures” she distinguishes from diction.
136  A 
poem is the mastery of verbal material by poetic perspective, and poetic perspective 
dwells in syntactic control.  Poetry can only shake words that “inertly rest” in their 
everyday meanings through syntax’s potential for a catachresis of quotidian language. 
This particular assertion of syntax’s superiority to lexis in lyric is hardly unique:  
Nowottny illuminates a broad and pervasive trend in our conceptions of lyric.  Borrowing 
from the terminology of Pierre Bourdieu, we might say that, in the habitus of the 
contemporary lyric field, syntax is the main distinction through which value is 
established, on which taste is based, and through which evaluation proceeds.
137   In 
academic formalism, as well as the formalism that appreciative engagements with poetry 
cannot avoid, lyric is most often approached, analyzed, evaluated by engaging its relative 
syntactic complexity.  Among contemporary critics, a good example of this is provided 
by Vendler, whose scholarly work and reviews of contemporary poetry both resolutely 
value syntactic complexity in “excavating the poem’s aesthetic totality,” in understanding 
it as a “verbal contraption.”
138  But to speak even more broadly, and engage in the often 
dubious, though sometimes productive, gesture of evoking a common experience, I 
would suggest that our typical understandings of lyric, however it is encountered, revert 
almost automatically to syntactic complexity as a main focus.  We may think about a 
strange word choice (why Ashbery juxtaposes booths and seasons with chaleur, or why 
                                                 
136Ibid., p. 26. 
137 See Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction:  A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, trans. Richard Nice 
(London:  Routledge, 1986). 
138 The first phrase belongs to Sidney Burris; see “Reviewing Contemporary Poetry:  Helen Vendler and the 
Aesthetic Method,” Contemporary Literature 31:2 (1990) p. 243.  The second is used by Vendler herself, 
though she borrows it from W.H. Auden; see Helen Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets (Cambridge, 
MA:  Harvard University Press, 1997).   Lowrance, 59 
Ammons rhymes goat and zygote), but we do so in the context of the broader structure of 
the poem as a whole, a structure that’s pursuit seems to invariably drift – however much 
against our higher theoretical will - toward the seduction of unity, the total syntactic 
cohesion of the poem as well wrought urn.
139  
But what is the significance of the fact that syntax is not the main category 
through which early modern poetry is conceived?  And what is the significance of this 
when we couple this realization with the realization of the fact that language is conceived 
in early modern lyric’s own meditations on itself as something material?  What we get, I 
think, is an (historical) problematization of some of the underlying reading practices on 
which formal and aesthetic engagements with literature are based.   
4.3.  Of all literary genres, lyric seems to lend itself most readily to what has 
come to be called “close reading”:  the interpretation of a given text entirely on its own 
terms.  While the term close reading is often casually employed in academic discussion, 
recent work by Roland Greene has suggested that it is by no means value-neutral.   
Rather, Greene claims, in its practical and pedagogical deployment, close reading relies 
on New Critical claims and assumptions about the ideology of text.
140  What this New 
Critical textual ideology most importantly insists on is that literary texts - particularly 
lyric texts - are inherently separate from social, cultural, and historical circumstances; 
that they are, in other words, autonomous text-objects.
 141 For lyric, such separation 
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springs from its origin as verbal representation of solitary speech or meditation.  Lyric, in 
other words, consists of solitary thought, solitary language, and accordingly, historical 
and social isolation. 
These last two claims about New Critical textual ideology of lyric are derived not 
from the critici classici of the school but rather from its most notable and powerful 
contemporary crusader:  Vendler.  These two sentences summarize the theory of lyric 
Vendler violently and polemically lays out in the introduction to her commentary on the 
Sonnets.  Vendler’s text is interesting to our current concern for a few reasons.  First, it 
embodies much of the modern mode of thinking about lyric I want to suggest the 
historical limitations of.  Second, it tries to apply this mode of lyrical understanding to an 
early modern text in a confident assertion of the trans-historical nature of lyric.  And third, 
it fashions itself as an explicit intervention in the cultural politics of literary and lyrical 
study - an attempt at rescuing the Bard of Avon’s sacred, sugared sonnets from the 
“jaundiced,” socially oriented interpretations of feminist, queer, and other critics.
142  I 
have already pointed to some of the historical limitations of such cognitively and 
syntactically biased ways of thinking about lyric.  Taking a closer look at Vendler will 
allow us to come to a final point:  that the modern subordination of lexis to syntax is the 
origin of history’s exclusion from formalist, or textualist, close reading. 
For Vendler, lyric’s resistance to historical or social readings dwells precisely in 
the relationship between the poem as syntactic whole and its lexical units.  
“Contemporary emphasis on the participation of literature in a social matrix,” she writes, 
“balks at acknowledging how lyric, though it may refer to the social, remains the genre 
                                                                                                                                                 
formalism (like Vendler).  But his points provide an interesting perspective on some of the claims I make 
here.  
142 Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, p. 2. Lowrance, 61 
that directs its mimesis toward the performance of the mind in solitary speech.”
143 Even 
though lyric can incorporate many social languages (or sociolects), it is not a “social 
genre” because “aesthetically speaking, it is what a lyric does with its borrowed social 
languages – i.e., how it casts them into new permutational and combinatorial forms – that 
is important.”
144  Vendler’s emphasis on this point warrants pondering.  For all her 
belletristic bluster, this particular proclamation seems to mask some anxiety about her 
ability to quite so easily write off the multitudinous and, often very interesting, 
scholarship that has focused on, or taken for its point of departure, the “sociolects” 
Shakespeare’s Sonnets contain.   
But to keep Shakespeare as a man “subdued to the aesthetic,” and so read his 
lyrics, accordingly, as self-contained “verbal contraptions” or “aesthetic games,” Vendler 
is forced to make an assertion about the significance of words that is severely 
anachronistic.
145  She scorns contemporary historical and social interpreters of 
Shakespeare for their own “anachronism” in assuming that the Sonnets’ use of sociolects 
demonstrates a concern with anything other than formal art for formal art’s sake.  It 
seems bizarre, then, that she seems ignorant of what is so clearly suggested in the two 
(fairly canonical) texts from Sidney discussed above:  that lexical significance rather than 
syntactic structure or contraption is seen as the chief constitutive element of lyric poetry 
in the Renaissance, and that, in this period, lexical items – words, or tropes – are seen not 
just as similar to, but ontological homogenous with, material things, like monsters or 
commodities.  
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4.4.  The values that Vendler’s reading brings to bear on lyric – the above-noted 
dominance of syntax over lexis, and the conceptualization of the poem as an aesthetic 
artifact, autonomous from anything other than itself, consisting of a crystallization of 
sensory or ideational experience, and operating thusly on an immaterial model of 
language – can be traced back their early stirrings in the intersection of lyric with the 
philosophical discourse of aesthetics, a term that was, in fact, first coined in a treatise 
about lyric poetry:  Alexander Baumgarten’s 1724 Meditationes Philosophicae de 
Nonnullis ad Poema Pertinentibus.  In this essay, Baumgarten establishes aesthetics as 
the science of the sensate faculties of the human mind (as opposed to logic, the science of 
the rational faculties of the human mind).
146  He hits on the term in the course of 
constructing what he calls a “philosophical poetics” (philosophia poetica), a scientific 
analysis of the laws governing the construction of good lyric poems.  Baumgarten’s 
elementary definitions of both poetry and language show clearly the movement of 
language from being located in the mind rather than the material world and an concordant 
emphasis on syntax, the connection between elements, over lexis, the delineation of their 
inherent characteristics.  Poetry, he claims, is a part of discourse (oratio).  Discourse is 
comprised of connected representations (repraesentationes connexas).  In poetic 
discourse, these representations are primarily sensate (sensitiva) rather than a rational.
147  
The aesthetics of philosophical poetics is thus concerned with laying down rules for 
bringing these connected sensory representations “to perfection” (ad perfectionem).  
Perfect poetry, Baumgarten writes, is perfect sensate discourse (oratio sensitiva perfecta), 
characterized by a complete coherence, focusing on a single thema in its engagement 
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with empirical particular(s).
148  Subordinating lexical to structural and syntactic priorities, 
Baumgarten anticipates the beginning of the dominant elevation of syntax in the lyric 
hermeneutics of the twentieth-century.  Defining discourse in terms of epistemological 
rather than phonological activity, he anticipates the pervasive later tendency to think of 
lyric poems as representations of experience or intellection (or as representations of 
utterances which represent experience or intellection).  And in establishing the criteria of 
unity, self-sufficiency, and self-contained focus for a perfecta poema, Baumgarten 
anticipates the dominant later tendency to think of lyric poems as autonomous aesthetic 
artifacts. 
 The historical space between Baumgarten’s notion of the poem as a perfected 
sensate discourse and the verbal icons and well wrought urns of the New Critics is, of 
course, immense.  But even if we survey this trajectory very broadly, we can see in 
Baumgarten the early nascence of a centripetal lyric hermeneutics, where lyric’s claims 
to intelligibility and beauty are reliant on autonomy, coherence, and the syntactic 
dominance of the lexical.  Though briefly, reductively, and schematically, I have tried in 
this chapter to signal that such claims are historically local, or contingent, rather than 
chronologically transcendent in their interpretive potential.  This comes through with 
particular clarity in Astrophil and Stella, which – as I have tried to suggest – both 
evidences a vanished paradigm for thinking about language and poetic production and 
points forward toward the conceptual structures that would replace it and that continue to 
dominate our own understandings of, and engagements with, literary texts. 
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